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RECENT CASES
PRODUCT LIABILITY - RETAIL PHARMACIST NOT
LIABLE FOR INJURIES TO PATIENT CAUSED
BY UNADULTERATED DRUG
McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co.,

174 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1965)
In McLeod v. W. S. Merrell Co.' a physician prescribed for
plaintiff McLeod's use a drug known as "Mer/29. ' 2 The drug had
been manufactured by W. S. Merrell Co. and sold by the manufacturer to the defendant pharmacies to be dispensed only on the
prescription of a physician. McLeod presented his prescriptions to
the pharmacies and they were compounded strictly in accordance
with the instructions of the physician. The drug caused severe
injuries to McLeod leading to the formation of cataracts and other
eye damage. McLeod brought suit against the manufacturer and
the pharmacies alleging breaches of implied warranties, of (1) reasonable fitness for the intended purpose; (2) merchantability; and
(3) wholesomeness or reasonable fitness for human consumption.
The third count was dropped as to the retail drug stores. The
lower court dismissed the complaint against the pharmacies, the
trial judge taking the view that the retail pharmacist does not
warrant the inherent fitness of drugs he sells on prescription.8
On appeal, a Florida intermediate appellate court affirmed. 4 Their
decision was certified to the Supreme Court of Florida on the
ground that "it passes upon a question of great public interest
because it affects the law of warranty relating to drugs sold by a
druggist pursuant to a doctor's prescription. 5 The supreme court
affirmed the decision.6
The question before the court was whether a retail pharmacist
who properly fills the prescription of a physician with an unadul-

1. McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So.2d 736 (Fla. 1965).
2. Mer/29 (Triparanol) was marketed in 1960 to reduce high cholesterol levels. It was used by about 500,000 persons for a two year period
before it was withdrawn from the market by the W.S. Merrell Co. because
of its association with the side effects of cataracts, hair loss and dermatitis.
Some 300 to 400 suits have been reportedly filed for injuries due to the use
Tribune, Aug. 26, 1963, p.1; New York Herald
of this drug. See Medical
12
Tribune, Sept. 3, 1963, p.

.

3.

174 So.2d at 738.

4.

McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 167 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1964).

5. McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So.2d at 738.
6. Ibid.
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terated drug 7 is liable to the patient-purchaser for breach of an
implied warranty of fitness or merchantability if the drug produces
harmful effects on such person. The purpose of this note is to
determine if the court was correct in holding that the pharmacist
was not liable for breach of warranty.
Historically, a recovery on a warranty theory did not require
proof of defendant's negligence 8 and therefore presented a desirable remedy for the plaintiff. Contributory negligence was of
little help as a defense to the seller or manufacturer-defendant. 9
Under either a negligence or warranty theory, product liability
depended upon privity of contract. 10
The landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." first

eliminated the requirement of privity in recovery on a negligence
theory for "[items] reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril when negligently made .... -12 Today a manufacturer has
little insulation, by virtue of privity, to protect him against a
negligently injured plaintiff. 13 When the product causing the injury is a foodstuff, privity has not been a bar to recovery. 14
Courts in dealing with food products for human consumption15 have
found many ingenious exceptions to the privity requirement.
Following logically, a state which does not require privity
with respect to food and beverages would also dispense with the
requirement where defective drugs for internal use' 6 are concerned. Indeed, in Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 7 a case brought
against the manufacturer of poliomyelitis vaccine, the court found
7. For a case involving adulterated drugs, see Campbell v. Brown,
85 Kan. 527, 117 Pac. 1010 (1911).
8. Challis v. Hartloff, 136 Kan. 823, 18 P.2d 199 (1933).
9. See Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, at
1147-48 (1960).

10. For a graphic illustration and exploration of the privity requirement see Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales Warranties, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 281, at 323 (1961). See
also, Note, 68 Dicx L. REV. 444, 445-47 (1964).
11. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916).

12. Id. at 389, 111 N.E. at 1055.
13. Prosser, supra note 9, at 1103.
14. Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal.2d 272, 93 P.2d 799 (1939).
For Pennsylvania food case see Cantani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95
At. 931 (1915), where the court relied on a pure food statute regarded as
declaratory of the common law. Later cases have ceased to rely on this
statute, Caskie v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A.2d 901 (1953).
15. See Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 ORE. L. REV. 119,
152-55 (1957), where there are listed twenty-nine "fictions, subterfuges
and bold strokes" attacking the privity requirement.
16. See Dickerson, The Basis of Strict Products Liability, 17 Bus.
L. REv. 157 (1961) wherein the author poses the question of a possible
distinction in liability between an ingested drug and a drug used externally such as a nasal spray, topical lotion or suppository.
17. 182 Cal.App.2d 602, 6 Cal.Rptr. 320 (1960).
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"no reason to differentiate the policy considerations requiring pure
and wholesome food from those requiring pure and wholesome
vaccine."' ' Does it reasonably follow that this liability imposed on
drug manufacturers for breach of an implied warranty of fitness
or merchantability should be extended to a retail pharmacist who
properly fills the prescription of a physician with an unadulterated
drug which produces harmful effects on the patient-purchaser?
Today's physician has a broad spectrum of ethical drugs1 9 from
which to choose in treating a patient. New drugs appear on the
market at an unprecedented rate. At the same time, ethical drugs
have become one of the most increasingly common products
in20
volved in tort litigation against suppliers and manufacturers.
Courts have imposed liability on retail merchants for breach
of an implied warranty of fitness or merchantability. 2 1 The policy
22
which imposes liability upon a grocer selling spoiled sardines
and wormy spinach 23 cannot be applied to impose liability upon a
retail merchant of drugs (pharmacist) dispensing an unadulterated
prescription drug. The McLeod court easily distinguishes these
cases of adulterated food from the
case at bar, because there was
'2 4
no adulteration of the "Mer/29.
An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is
conditioned upon the buyer's reliance on the skill and judgment of
the seller to supply a commodity suitable for the intended purpose.25 Such a warranty cannot arise with respect to the retail
pharmacist, because the patient-purchaser quite obviously does not
rely on the judgment of the retail pharmacist in assuming that
the drug would be fit for its intended purpose. The patient puts
18. Id. at 323. See also, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case
Study of Manufacturer's Liability Without Fault in Tort and Warranty,
65 YALE L.J. 262 (1955). But cf., Condon, Restatement or Reformation?,
17 Bus. L. REv. 167 (1961).

19. Ethical drugs refers to drugs available on prescription only as
distinguished from proprietary or patent drugs sold over the counter.
The term "drug" is defined to include both ethical and proprietary drugs
-in § 201 (g) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 321 (g) (1958).

A "prescription drug" is defined in

§ 503 (b) of the Act as one which "because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the method of its use, or the collateral
measures necessary for its use, is not safe for use except under the supervision of a practitioner ...
" 52 Stat. 1050 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)
(1958).

20. See Rheingold, Products Liability, The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 20 FOOD DaUG COsM. L.J. 328 (1965).
21. Prosser, supra, note 9, says that liability has been imposed on
retailers in all but two or three states listing as exceptions Mississippi
and Virginia.
22. Spencer v. Carl's Markets Inc., 45 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1950).
23.

Food Fair Stores of Florida v. Macurda, 93 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1957).

24.

174 So.2d at 738.

25.

Smith v. Burdines, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940).

UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 2-315.

See
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his reliance upon the physician who prescribes the medicament.
A further distinction between warranty liability imposed on
an ordinary retail merchant and that imposed upon a pharmacist
dispensing prescription drugs can be made. The furnishing of
prescription drugs is not so much of a sale, in the usual sense of
the word, as it is the rendering of a service.2 In compounding
any prescription, it is the service of the pharmacist which predominates in the relationship with the patient, and the transfer of
27
personal property is but an incidental feature of the transaction.
The service concept of the dispensing of prescription drugs is
perfectly sound when it is considered that such drugs are not
offered as goods for public sale. They are not sold "over the
counter;" they may only be obtained on the prescription of a
physician.
Retail pharmacists should not be converted into insurers of
the safety of a manufacturer's unadulterated drug by applying to
them the rapidly expanding concept of strict liability without
fault in an action in tort.28 The comments to section 402 A of the
Restatement29 note that there is a class of unavoidably unsafe
products which are, in the present state of human knowledge incapable of being made safe for their ordinary and intended use.
Drugs are a common example of such a product.3 0 The comment
continues:
The seller of such products [drugs], again with the
qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation
calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because
he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk. 3 '
The doctrine of strict liability to the consumer upon the warranty theory has grown from considerations of public and social
policy. Stronger public policy militates against the imposition of
the doctrine on the retail pharmacist who dispenses a prescription
26. See, 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 32.02[1], at
227 (1961).
27. Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792
(1954). Dibblee v. Dr. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 12 Utah
2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961). These cases held that a hospital, in supply-

ing blood for a transfusion, was performing a service rather than selling
blood.
28.

Prosser, supra note 9, at 1112-13, where Dean Prosser lists "seven

spectacular decisions" which hold that the seller of any product who sells
it in a condition dangerous for use is strictly liable to its ultimate user for
injuries resulting from such use, although the seller has exercised all posRESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402 A (1964).
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402 A, comment k (1964).
30. Ibid.
31. Id. (Emphasis added.)

sible care. See generally,
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drug which causes side effects to a patient placed on the drug by
his physician.
The best interests of society demand the continuing development of new drugs and their prescription and marketing, subject to
approval by the Federal Food and Drug Administration.3 2 Occasionally the scientists are wrong and their mistakes escape detection by the F.D.A., the agency established to catch such mistakes.
Society and justice cannot reasonably demand that the pharmacist,
who dispenses such a drug on the prescription of a physician,
should be liabile to the patient injured as a result of taking this
medication.
[T]he rights of the consumer can be preserved, and the
responsibilities of the retail prescription druggist can be
imposed, under the concept that a druggist who sells a
prescription warrants that (1) he will compound the drug
prescribed; (2) he has used due and proper care in filling
the prescription (failure of which might also give rise to
action in negligence); (3) the proper methods were used in
the compounding process; (4) the drug has not3 been infected with some adulterating foreign substance.3
LEWIS F. GouLD,

JR.

32. See Rheingold, supra note 20, at 36 for an extensive discussion of
the Federal regulations imposed upon the development and marketing of
new drugs.
33. McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., 174 So.2d at 739.

MAGISTRATES, ALDERMEN, JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE

-

JURISDICTION OVER ACTION OF

TRESPASS ON THE CASE
McCullough v. Stanton Constr. Co.,
35 Pa. D. & C. 2d 421 (C.P. 1964).
Whether magistrates and justices of the peace have jurisdiction over actions of trespass on the case was disputed again in the
recent Pennsylvania lower court case of McCullough v. Stanton
Constr. Co.' when it, following the lead of a prior common pleas
decision, 2 held that a plaintiff cannot bring a civil action arising
from the operation and use of a motor vehicle before a magistrate,
alderman or justice of the peace under section 1303 of the Motor
Vehicle Code 3 when the action is one of trespass on the case. That
Act reads in part:
All civil actions for damages, arising from the use and operation of any vehicle, may, at the discretion of the plaintiff, be brought before any magistrate, alderman, or justice
of the peace, in4 the county wherein the alleged damages
were sustained.
It cannot be denied that this decision is consistent with the
overwhelming majority of prior cases declaring that justices of
the peace have no jurisdiction over actions on the case." What
may be questioned, however, is whether this result accurately
reflects the legislative intent behind the Motor Vehicle Code and
whether the authority relied on for this decision was correct in its
statutory interpretation. Obviously, the phrase "all civil actions"
is broad enough to include trespass on the case as well as trespass
vi et armis.0 It would seem that compelling cause must exist for
a court to find in this language a legislative intent to exclude actions of trespass on the case from the justices' jurisdiction.
Clearly, the civil jurisdiction of justices of the peace, aldermen
and magistrates is limited to that extended to them by the legislature.7 The McCullough case is the latest in a series of judicial
explications which have interpreted these legislative grants.8 Seen
in the prespective of these preceding cases and the development
of the applicable statutes, the McCullough decision, it is suggested,
1. 35 Pa. D. & C.2d 421 (C.P. 1964).
2. See Ghezzi v. Price, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 321 (C.P. 1961).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1303 (1960).
4. Ibid.
5.
26 Pa.
6.
7.

E.g., Murphy v. Thall, 17 Pa. Super. 500 (1901); Weaver v. Kleahn,
County Ct. 117 (1902).
McClellan v. Powers, 22 Pa. D. & C. 447 (C.P. 1935).
Murdy v. McCutcheon, 95 Pa. 435 (1880).

8. See Comment, Pa. J. P. Courts-Jurisdiction--ConstitutionalProblems, 64 DIcK. L. R. 157 (1959-60).
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is questionable authority for future courts attempting to determine whether the legislature has granted justices of the peace
jurisdiction where actions on the case are involved.
The Act of 18141 gave justices of the peace and aldermen
jurisdiction of "actions of trover and conversion, and of actions of
trespass" when the damage did not exceed one-hundred dollars.' 0
The term "trespass" in that statute was construed to mean trespass vi et armis but not trespass on the case.1 ' When the Act of
187912 raised the jurisdictional amount to three-hundred dollars
the courts continued to find that justices of the peace could not
entertain actions on the case although apparently no legislative
reason for excluding such actions from the justices' realm was
suggested. 13 These results rested on the procedural distinction
retained in Pennsylvania practice between trespass and trespass
on the case. As a form of action the term trespass had a clearly
established meaning which plainly excluded actions on the case.
There could, therefore, be little question of the legislature's intent
when it used the word trespass in a statute referring to forms of
action.
The Act of 188714 abolished the distinction between trespass
and case as to procedure only according to the draftsmen of the
statute. 15 Henceforth, the action of trespass was to include trespass on the case as well as trover and conversion. This abolition
of the procedural distinction made it at least questionable whether
justices could, by virtue of the merger, decide actions on the case.
The courts held, however, that this act refers to procedure only
to extend
and as such does not indicate an intent of the legislature
16
justices' jurisdiction to an area theretofore excluded.
Cases construing the foregoing acts providing for the general
jurisdiction of justices of the peace and the act abolishing the procedural distinction between trespass and trespass on the case,
stood until 1923 as solid authority for the proposition that justices
of the peace had no jurisdiction over actions on the case. In that
year, however, the predecessor of the Motor Vehicle Code section
construed by the McCullough court was enacted. 17 That statute
read the same as the present Code except for jurisdictional amount
and gave justices of the peace special jurisdiction over all civil
actions involving the operation and use of motor vehicles wherein
the damages sought did not exceed three hundred dollars. The
jurisdiction granted by this act was in addition to the general
9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 331 (1930).
10. Ibid.
11. Paff v. Slack, 7 Pa. 254 (1847).

§

241 (1930).

12.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,

13.

Moreland Twp. v. Gordner, 109 Pa. 116 (1885).

14.

-15.
16.
17.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,

§

2 (1953).

Ibid.
Burkhead v. Ward, 35 Pa. Super 235 (1908).
Pa. Laws 1923, Act 718, § 30.
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grant contained in the Act of 1814 as amended. A number of
courts held that the broad phrase "all civil actions" included actions formerly known as trespass on the case and thus indicated a
legislative intent to expand the jurisdiction of justices of the
peace to include actions on the case arising from the operation and
use of a motor vehicle.18 In the well reasoned opinion of Campbell
v. Krautheim'9 the court said:
[W] e find no difficulty in holding that when the legislature
said 'all civil actions for damages arising from the use and
operation of any motor vehicle', it meant all civil actions.
. .
The considerations of convenience and of justice
which may have moved the legislature to abolish the technical distinctions in suits before magistrates or justices of
the peace, and which have long since outlived their value,
are not far to seek. In many cases when damage is
caused by a motor-car, an action before a magistrate may
and should recommend itself to the injured party as the
most expeditious method of obtaining compensation for his
the amount involved is less than a hundamages, when
20
dred dollars.
Another Pennsylvania lower court 2' found the plain meaning of the statute to extend justices' jurisdiction to trespass on the
case:
The constant tendency is to make litigation less cumbersome and to make legal remedies more readily available,
and the instant court feels that the jurisdiction conferred
should not be
...
by the plain language of the code
22
changed by judicial interpretation.
In 1938 the Superior Court examined this statute for the first
time in Paulson v. Eisenberg23 and held that any construction of
the act that would confer jurisdiction on the case to justices of the
peace in automobile cases only would cause the statute to violate
the Pennsylvania Constitution 4 which prohibits the legislature
from passing any "local" or "special" law regulating the jurisdiction of courts, aldermen, justices of the peace or other tribunals.
Favoring a constitutional construction of the act, the court reasoned that a grant of jurisdiction over case solely in automobile cases would be a "special" law within the meaning of the
constitution because plaintiffs in other civil actions could not,
bring an action
under the statute conferring general jurisdiction,
2
on the case before a justice of the peace. 1
*

18. Walsh v. Martin, 21 Pa. D. & C. 98 (C.P. 1934); Campbell v.
Krautheim, 4 Pa. D. & C. 577 (C.P. 1924).
19. 4 Pa. D. & C. 577 (C.P. 1924).

20. Id. at 579.
21. Walsh v. Martin, 21 Pa. D. & C. 98 (C.P. 1934).
22. Id. at 100.
23.
24.

134 Pa. Super 503, 4 A.2d 585 (1938).
PA. CONST. art. III, § 7.

25.

134 Pa. Super. at 508.
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Much can be said in favor of the Eisenberg reasoning, particularly since the interpretation of the act granting general jurisdiction at the time of this decision clearly indicated that justices
had no jurisdiction over case in other civil actions. It is important to remember, however, that the constitutional issue raised in
Eisenberg hinges entirely upon a determination that the general
statute conferring jurisdiction on justices of the peace denies
them jurisdiction over trespass on the case. If justices have jurisdiction generally over actions on the case, the Eisenberg decision
does nothing to disestablish their jurisdiction over vehicle actions
on the case under the Act of 1923.

The Act of 1923 was amended by the Act of

1959,26

the statute

construed by the McCullough court. Had the situation been the
same as in 1938 the McCullough court could have quickly made a
determination based entirely on the Eisenberg precedent. In the
intervening years, however, the statute conferring general jurisdiction on justices of the peace was amended. The Act of 1955,27
entitled "an Act . . . enlarging the jurisdiction of aldermen,
magistrates, and justices of the peace," confers jurisdiction over
"all actions arising from contract, either express or implied, and
of all actions of trespass [and of trover and conversion], wherein
the sum demanded does not exceed [three hundred] five hundred
($500) dollars ....,,28
To date only one court has directly decided whether the Act
of 1955 extends the general jurisdiction of justices of the peace,
aldermen and magistrates to include trespass on the case. In
Ghezzi v. Price29 a common pleas court held that the intent of the
draftsmen of the Act of 1955 was only to increase the jurisdictional
amount from three hundred to five hundred dollars and not to
enlarge the jurisdiction to include actions on the case. By way of
dicta the McCullough court echoed this result. Both courts reasoned that justices of the peace still have no jurisdiction over trespass on the case because the Act of 1955 uses essentially the same
language as the Act of 1879 which had been construed many times
to exclude actions on the case.30 Yet one searches through these
two decisions in vain to find a rule of construction which justifies
their conclusion. The McCullough decision suggested that section
551 of the Statutory Construction Act,3 ' authorizing past statutory
and case law to be utilized in determining legislative intent, might
32
be helpful but the court failed to elaborate.

26.

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 75,

§ 1303 (1960).

27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 241 (Supp. 1964).
28. The Statutory Construction Act provides that the language in
brackets has been deleted. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 571 (1952).
29.

Ghezzi v. Price, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 321 (C.P. 1961).

30.

McCullough v. Stanton Constr. Co., 35 Pa. D. & C.2d at 429; Ghezzi

v. Price, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d at 326.
31. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 46, § 551 (1952).

32. McCullough v. Stanton Constr. Co., 35 Pa.:D. & C.2d at 428.

Fall 1965]

RECENT CASES

How persuasive is the argument that "trespass" in the Act of
1955 means the same as in the Act of 1879 because the wording in
the new act is the same used in the old? The Statutory Construction Act provides that titles, headings and preambles of a law may
be considered in the construction of the act, although they should
not be considered to control . 3 It is to be remembered that the
title to the Act of 1955 states that its purpose is to enlarge the
jurisdiction granted justices of the peace under the Act of 1879.
The marginal note reiterates this motive with the words "jurisdiction enlarged. '34 What must the legislature say that could
more clearly indicate their intent to enlarge the justices' jurisdiction? The act's direct effect is to enlarge the justices' jurisdiction. Its indirect effect is to make the distinction between trespass and trespass on the case no longer applicable to justices of
the peace, giving trespass and case the same merged meaning they
have had before other tribunals since 1887. There is no need for
the legislature to state all of the indirect effects of a statute in its
preamble as the Supreme Court has said:
There is no constitutional requirement that acts of general legislation shall give notice of all their indirect effects on existing law... . . The Constitution requires that
the title of an act shall clearly express its subject. That is
notice to some extent of3 its
direct effect, and that is as far
5
as it is practicable to go.
A judicial rule of statutory construction is that a change in
language in an amendatory law indicates a change in legislative
intent.3 6 Both Ghezzi and McCullough note that the Act of 1955
deletes the words "trover and conversion" following the word
trespass. Neither, however, commented on the significance of this
exclusion.3 7 There are at least two possible reasons the legislature
deleted those words: either the draftsmen intended to reduce the
jurisdiction of justices of the peace by excluding these actions
from their realm or they were aware that the words were no
longer necessary because the action of trespass, by virtue of the
Act of 1887, now embodies the action formerly called trover
and conversion. The first construction runs into conflict with the
avowed purpose of the statute which is to "enlarge" the justices'
jurisdiction. Furthermore, justices of the peace have continued
unquestioned to hear trover actions since 1955.
The second construction gives recognition to the stated purpose of the act and logically follows because the act conferring
33. PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 46, § 554 (1952).
34. Pa. Laws 1955, act 817, § 1.
35. Commonwealth v. Keystone Benefits Ass'n, 171 Pa. 465, 473, 32 At.
1027, 1032 (1895).
36. Vince v. .Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co., 153
A.2d 788 (1943).

Pa. Super. 333, 33

37. McCullough v. Stanton Constr. Co., 35 Pa. D. & C.2d at 428; Ghezzi
v. Price, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d at 326.
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general jurisdiction had not been amended since the Act of 1887.
It follows, then, that if the draftsmen consciously and meticulously removed the words "trover and conversion" from the act
with the understanding that these forms of action are included in
the action of "trespass," they clearly intended to utilize the definition of trespass arising out of the Act of 1887. They were, therefore, aware that the action of trespass also includes trespass on
the case. If they had intended to exclude case from the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace they would have added words to
that effect.
The word "trespass" as a form of action is a technical term
defined by the Act of 1887. The Statutory Construction Act
specifically provides that technical words and phrases shall be
8
construed according to their peculiar meaning.3
In most instances the word "shall" is mandatory, 8thus
requiring
the courts
9
to use the technical definition of trespass.
The McCullough court seemed to suggest that section 551 of
the Statutory Construction Act would apply here because the
former law on a subject should be referred to in ascertaining
legislative intent.40 The trouble with applying prior case law here
to determine the meaning of "trespass" is that all of the cases up
to 1955 were construing an act promulgated before 1887 when the
term "trespass" by statute took on a new meaning with reference
to forms of action. When the Act of 1879 was enacted the action
of trespass clearly did not include trespass on the case and the
plethora of cases that followed so held. When the Act of 1955 was
enacted, however, the action of trespass, as defined by the Act of
1887, clearly included trespass on the case and the draftsmen indicated their awareness of the new meaning by striking the words
"trover and conversion." To apply prior cases here to ascertain
the meaning of "trespass" would be to turn one's back on the Act
of 1887 and the draftsmen's careful deletion of the words "trover
and conversion." Furthermore, section 551 of the Statutory Construction Act is intended to apply "when the words of a law are
not explicit." 41 It seems that the definition of trespass contained
in the Act of 1887 is quite clear. Finally, even if section 551 were
to apply, the former law test is only one of seven tests suggested
for determining legislative
intent and no one should be viewed as
42
existing in a vacuum.
It would seem, therefore, that a fair effort to reach a conclusion regarding legislative intent in the Act of 1955 must be based
on something more substantial than the mere fact that the act
repeats words used in the Act of 1879. The application of a few
38. PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 46, § 533 (1952).
39. Kuzman v. Kamien, 139 Pa. Super. 538, 12 A.2d 471 (1939).
40. McCullough v. Stanton Constr. Co., 35 D. & C.2d at 428.
41. PA. STAT. AxN. tit. 46, § 551 (1952).
42. Ibid.
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135

established rules of statutory construction indicates that the legislature's intent was to enlarge the justices' jurisdiction to include
trespass on the case. The preamble of the act, the exclusion of
the words "trover and conversion," and the conscious use of a
technical term all support this conclusion. It is suggested, therefore, that the basis of the decision in McCullough is incorrect. If,
under the Act of 1955, justices of the peace have jurisdiction over
actions of trespass on the case, it follows that the constitutional
objections of the Eisenberg case have no application to section
1303 of the Motor Vehicle Code of 1959.
GEORGE COLE

